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 Executive Summary 
 
Currently, the effect of human impact on the environment is becoming 
increasingly apparent. The encroachment of human activity has inevitably resulted in the 
loss or impairment of ecological goods and services (EG&S) around the globe as well as 
in our own backyard. EG&S include features such as wildlife habitat, biodiversity, soil 
renewal, or nutrient cycling. The loss of such features has become a sobering reality for 
Manitobans in the face of the eutrophication of Lake Winnipeg as a result of practices 
contributing to nutrient loading into the lake. Since EG&S are very important to 
Manitobans, efforts are being made to explore different vehicles to encourage their 
provision. In order to address some of the environmental issues transpiring in Manitoba, 
there has been discussion on the usefulness of Market Based Instruments (MBIs). In the 
past, a number of programs focused on the environment in agriculture have been put 
forward and administered, however these have not been overly successful in incenting 
producers or providing significant levels of EG&S. This report will provide a summary of 
a series of workshops developed to bring awareness to stakeholders on an MBI known as 
a conservation auction (which may also be referred to as reverse auction, procurement 
auction, or tender).    
The purpose of this series of workshops was to create awareness of the 
conservation auction process and how it applies to the provision of EG&S by producers 
in Manitoba; moreover it was an opportunity to receive feedback on the applicability of 
auctions in Manitoba.  
  The objectives for this series of workshops are as follows: 
•  Determine the opinions of relevant stakeholders in regards to the relevance of 
auctions in Manitoba 
•  Investigate auction design features such as payment type, competition, and 
communication 
•  Conduct an economic analysis of the results of the auction simulations 
provided in the workshops for educational purposes 
 
EG&S are the positive environmental benefits arising from healthy ecosystems. 
They are fundamentally complex and have no associated market value, which makes it 
difficult to develop relevant policy. Environmental programs typically use fixed payment 
or cost sharing agreements to procure EG&S but they have been found to be unsuccessful 
partly because of inadequate levels of compensation. An alternative approach is to use 
MBIs to deliver EG&S programs.  
MBIs are policy instruments that use market forces, prices, or other economic 
variables to change behaviour. They can either create a market, where no market is 
currently operating, or improve a market if there is market failure. These tools utilize 
trading mechanisms, direct payments, price signals, or auctions to capture value that may 
have been overlooked under the present policy scheme. This is a key feature that makes 
MBIs appropriate to use in the context of EG&S since their value is unknown. Therefore, 
through the use of MBIs we can gain more knowledge and understanding of the costs and 
benefits of EG&S. In the case of EG&S procurement, conservation auctions are a viable 
option as a method to purchase EG&S from producers in a cost effective way.    ii
Auction mechanisms use market forces in the face of information asymmetry
1 and 
act as a price discovery system for EG&S. With competition as the driving force, 
participants are induced to reveal their compliance costs through the bidding process 
(Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). This is because participants must face tradeoffs 
related to the probability of their bid being accepted and their resulting payoff. Thus 
participants are revealing some of their own cost information while receiving a payment 
adequate to cover their costs.  
Conservation auctions are a unique type of procurement auction where 
participants place bids for providing EG&S. Like a conventional procurement auction, 
participants submit bids indicating the price they are willing to accept/willing to sell their 
good or service for. The bids are then ordered from lowest to highest (can be either $/unit 
or whole price).  Unlike conventional procurement auctions, typically, multiple winners 
are selected from lowest to highest until either a budget is exhausted or a unit target is 
met. 
Auction design is an important factor in maintaining economic efficiency in 
conservation auctions. Since conventional auction theory cannot be used to guide design, 
auction experiments in an economic laboratory have been utilized to test different designs 
to understand their efficiency capability as well as their ability to act as a cost discovery 
tool (Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). Important design measures to consider are: the method 
of payment; use of target versus budget constraints; is information revealed or hidden; the 
use of a reservation price or target; and bid evaluation systems. 
In total 13 workshops were completed between the dates of March 8, 2010 and 
March 19, 2010. Originally 15 sessions were scheduled; however due to limited 
attendance participants from two sessions were rescheduled to other sessions. Four 
treatments were used during the series of workshops; two payment structures 
(discriminatory (D) and uniform(U)) and two bid ranking structures (maximize coverage 
(MC) (or acres) and maximize kg phosphorus abatement (MP)): 4 MCU, 3 MCD, 3 
MPU, and 3 MPD. 
  Light economic analysis of the auction simulation results was conducted. As these 
workshops were being used more as an information tool to stakeholders, the results of the 
auctions most likely do not reflect real behaviour; therefore caution and scrutiny should 
be used when interpreting the results. Despite discrepancies, lessons may still be learned 
from the results.  
  Profit maximizing, or rent seeking, behaviour was apparent in almost all auction 
simulations. This is mostly attributed to the low rate of competition in some rounds. 
Where there was low competition the cost effectiveness of the auction would ultimately 
decrease and could not be used as a cost discovery mechanism. It was difficult to see any 
major differences between the two payment methods, however on two occasions the 
uniform payment yielded negative rent, in other words people were bidding below their 
costs on average.  
  At the conclusion of each auction simulation, participants were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire asking for their opinions on the workshop itself, as well as more detailed 
questions pertaining to environmental programming in Manitoba and opinions about the 
conservation auction mechanism. Overall, there was a positive response to the 
                                                 
1 Where two parties both hold private information that is not known to the other party, in this case the 
parties are government and producers.    iii
mechanism. There was a distinct divide between producers and other groups (e.g. 
government, NGOs, and academia) according to the recorded responses.  
  In the discussion that followed each workshop, similar concerns were brought to 
the table regardless of demographics. These encompassed how the auction would be 
implemented down to details about administration and monitoring; producer concerns 
related to the estimation of costs, fairness to the producer, the competitive nature of the 
auction, and contract lengths; as well as discussions about environmental programming in 
general that were not specifically related to the conservation auction process.  
  Taking time to think through auction design will also be necessary in order to 
have an auction that caters to the public and producers, and will be cost effective. While 
it may be too soon to be discussing details surrounding the implementation or design of 
an auction in Manitoba, more thought may be required on related issues such as 
development of an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) and associated extension 
program.  
These workshops were developed to allow stakeholders to become aware of the 
conservation auction, and learn more about the process and why they are implemented 
around the world. It was also a platform of discussion amongst stakeholders to gauge how 
acceptable an auction would be in Manitoba to procure EG&S from producers: a lot of 
information and ideas were shared from all sides of the story. Overall, it was a very 
positive experience for those involved and a positive reaction to the auction process was 
encountered. However, some still remain apprehensive and skeptical of the mechanism in 
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1 Introduction 
 
Currently, the effect of human impact on the environment is becoming 
increasingly apparent. The encroachment of human activity has inevitably resulted in the 
loss or impairment of Ecological Goods and Services (EG&S) around and globe as well 
as in our own backyard. This has become a sobering reality for Manitobans in the face of 
the eutrophication of Lake Winnipeg as a result of practices contributing to the degree of 
nutrient loading into the lake. Since EG&S are very important to Manitobans, efforts are 
being made to explore different vehicles to encourage their provision. This report will 
provide a summary of a series of workshops developed to bring awareness to 
stakeholders of a Market Based Instrument (MBI) known as a conservation auction (also 
known as reverse auction, procurement auction, or tender).  
    
1.2 Background  Information 
 
  EG&S are the positive environmental benefits arising from the ecological 
functions of healthy ecosystems. EG&S can be identified as goods (e.g. food, fuel, water, 
air, habitat, biodiversity), services (e.g. nutrient cycling, water purification, soil renewal), 
and use value (e.g. recreation and aesthetic beauty). EG&S are fundamentally complex 
systems with layers of linkages specific to the physical conditions around. Another 
complexity is that there is no direct value attached to EG&S; therefore you cannot 
directly estimate the value or the cost of EG&S. This makes it difficult for policy makers 
to create relevant policy or programs related to EG&S: since they A) do not know the 
benefits from providing EG&S and B) do not know the costs of providing EG&S, it is 
difficult to know the extent resources should be used on EG&S.  
A majority of environmental programs in agriculture are based on fixed payments 
or cost sharing agreements as incentives for voluntary actions to engage in 
environmentally friendly practices (e.g. ALUS, National Farm Stewardship Payments, 
MHHC conservation easement). A shortcoming of these types of programs is that they 
might not be offering an adequate level of incentive to those producers who could 
potentially provide a large amount of EG&S because they might have high costs 
associated with the EG&S. Conversely, the payment could also induce those who have 
already committed to conservation activities (therefore not gaining any more EG&S), or 
induce producers who provide low levels of EG&S from unproductive, low-cost land. If 
there was more information available about the price of EG&S in agriculture, an 
equilibrium price could easily be reached for each individual; unfortunately we are in a 
world of information asymmetry
2 and information is not easily shared between parties. 
While there may not be price tags on habitat or biodiversity, market forces can still be 
used as a way to overcome this difficulty with the use of MBIs.  
  MBIs are policy instruments that use market forces, prices, or other economic 
variables to change behaviour. They can either create a market, where no market is 
                                                 
2 Information asymmetry is when individual parties hold information specific to them and is not known to 
the other party.    2
currently operating, or improve a market if there is market failure. These tools utilize 
trading mechanisms, direct payments, price signals, or auctions to capture value that may 
have been overlooked under the present policy scheme. This is a key feature that makes 
MBIs appropriate to use in the context of EG&S since their value is unknown. Therefore, 
through the use of MBIs we can gain more knowledge and understanding of the costs and 
benefits of EG&S. Some examples of MBIs are tradable permit frameworks, taxation for 
polluters, and conservation auctions. While all of these instruments are useful, the context 
of use is very important to consider when choosing a tool.  In the case of EG&S 
procurement, conservation auctions are a viable option to purchase EG&S from 
producers in a cost effective way.  
Conservation auction mechanisms use market forces in the face of information 
asymmetry and act as a price discovery system for EG&S. With competition as the 
driving force, participants are induced to reveal their compliance costs through the 
bidding process (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). This is because participants must 
face tradeoffs related to the probability of their bid being accepted and their resulting 
payoff. Thus participants are revealing some of their own cost information while 
receiving a payment adequate to cover their costs.  
  Conservation auctions have been increasing in popularity recently as a way to 
procure EG&S in the agricultural landscape. The United States have used auctions for the 
delivery of payments for conservation activities in the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) (Reichelderfer & Boggess 1998). They have also been used in water management 
policy in the United States to distribute irrigation permits (Cummings et al. 2004; 
Hartwell & Aylward 2007). They have been used widely in Australia to increase the level 
of biodiversity in agriculture (Stoneham et al. 2003; Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). 
They have also been applied in Europe as a mechanism to distribute payments and 
acquire EG&S from producers (Groth 2005).  
  While there is documented use of the conservation auction framework around the 
world, there has been little experience in Canada with respect to the use of auctions for 
EG&S. However, as people become more familiar with the concept, it is being applied in 
certain areas in Canada. Recently an auction was held in Saskatchewan with the 
cooperation of the Assiniboine Watershed Stewardship Association, Ducks Unlimited 
Canada, and the Saskatchewan Watershed Authority to restore wetlands to increase duck 
production (and indirectly other EG&S). The auction held was found to be successful in 
selecting producers to restore wetlands at an average cost of approximately $1000/acre, 
which is comparable to empirical studies on the cost of wetland restoration to producers 
(AWSA 2009). The auction framework was also utilized in the national hog transition 
program in 2009, where producers were issued payments to set aside their hog production 
for a minimum of 3 years (CPC 2009).    3
 
1.3  Conservation Auction Theory   
 
  Auction theory in the context of EG&S procurement is a relatively new field of 
study, and the overall body of literature is somewhat limited and inconclusive. However, 
traditional auction theory provides a well established point to draw conclusions and 
insight into the realm of EG&S auctions. 
  Conservation auctions are a unique type of procurement auction
3 where 
participants place bids to provide EG&S. Like conventional procurement auctions, 
participants submit bids indicating the price they are willing to accept/willing to sell their 
good or service for. The bids are then ordered from lowest to highest (can be either $/unit 
or whole price).  Unlike conventional procurement auctions, typically multiple winners 
are selected from lowest to highest bid until either a fixed budget is exhausted or an 
EG&S unit target is met. There are also a number of other unique features of 
conservation auctions that set them apart from conventional theory and assumptions
4.  
Conservation auctions typically deal with the trading of multiple items whereas 
auctions are usually based on the sale of one single item/contract. In conservation 
auctions the participants may be able to submit multiple units of EG&S and the agency 
holding the auction will be accepting multiple units of EG&S. While the effect of multi-
item auction is not well known studies have shown that under certain conditions efficient 
outcomes can be achieved, however it may lead to acts of collusion and rent
5 seeking 
depending on the payment method chosen
6 (Klemperer 1999).  
Bidders are heterogeneous entities in the provision of EG&S. In other words each 
farmer will have different underlying conditions on their land (e.g. soil quality, water 
availability) which contribute to heterogeneous costs as well as heterogeneous levels of 
EG&S quality. Heterogeneous costs will also be influenced by additional costs in the 
construction or implementation of bids. Farmers may experience additional opportunity 
costs from efforts required in assessing their land as well as in the auction process. This 
could contribute to low participation rates in existing procurement auctions and could 
also augment bid determination. This is also a reason why fixed payment scheme achieve 
limited success.  
Farmers are also more likely to be risk averse rather than risk neutral, which is not 
an assumption under conventional theory. This is a widely held assumption for farmers 
and is used for multiple areas of research (Unterschulz pers.comm). Latacz-Lohmann and 
Van der Hamsvoort (1997) found in a bidding simulation that risk aversion, and high 
uncertainty regarding reserve price, can affect bidding behaviour away from the optimal 
strategy and subsequently lead to inefficient outcomes.  
                                                 
3 A procurement auction (or conservation auction) is a type of auction where there are multiple sellers and 
one central buyer; the opposite of a conventional auction where there are multiple buyers and one central 
seller.  
4 See Appendix for assumptions 
5 Rent is a term used in economics to refer to profit above covering costs.  
6 Payment methods will be discussed in the following section   4
Lastly, payments may not necessarily be a function of bids only. Payments may 
be influenced by factors such as the payment method chosen, the level of competition 
among bidders, or the presence of collusive behaviour.  
  Despite the fundamental differences, the conservation auction can be used as a 
cost discovery tool, working under similar principles as the conventional auction. Bidders 
will still make tradeoffs between the probability of winning and making a profit in the 
face of competition. However, auction theory cannot act as a guide as to how to design or 
evaluate conservation auctions.  
 
1.4 Auction  Design   
 
  Auction design is an important factor in maintaining economic efficiency in 
conservation auctions. Since conventional auction theory cannot be used to guide design, 
auction experiments in an economic laboratory have been utilized to test different designs 
to understand their efficiency capability as well as their ability to act as a cost discovery 
tool (Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). Important design measures to consider are: the method 
of payment method; use of target versus budget constraints; is information revealed or 
hidden; the use of a reservation price or target; and bid evaluation systems.  
 
1.4.1 Payment  Method 
  
In a reverse auction, there are different methods in which payments may be 
distributed to winners. The most common methods are discriminatory, uniform 1
st price, 
and uniform 2
nd price (or Vickrey auction). Each method has its own pros and cons in 
relation to their effectiveness in preventing information rent seeking
7, producing a cost 
effective auction and acting as a cost discovery mechanism. This is largely based on how 
bidding behaviour is affected by the payment methods. The pricing rule is an integral 
design key in conservation auctions because the format dictates how contract payments 
are determined based on bids (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005) and directly 
contributes to the effectiveness of the auction.  
Under discriminatory pricing, a successful bidder in an auction will receive a 
payment equal to the submitted bid price. This type of pricing limits the amount of 
uncertainty bidders would face as their respective bids would both determine their chance 
of winning and the price they would receive if successful (Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). 
This provides an opportunity for participants to seek rent (payments above costs) in 
anticipation of getting the highest possible payment. The literature indicates that the 
optimal strategy for participants is to overbid under discriminatory pricing in order to 
receive a large payment and acquire a net gain. This is especially true for those who can 
provide EG&S at relatively low cost 
8; knowing that it is relatively inexpensive for them 
to provide a service, they may misrepresent their costs and bid as if they were a high cost 
landowner in order to have net gain from their payment and still remain competitive 
                                                 
7 Profit that is gained when bidders hold private information about their costs or EG&S 
8 This can be as a result of either low costs, or very high EG&S potential on their land.   5
among other bidders. High cost participants are more likely to bid close to their costs 
knowing that the highest acceptable bid is probably not much more than their own costs. 
  Under a uniform pricing framework all successful bidders are paid the same price 
(full or unit price). In this case, the bid submitted determines the chance of winning, but 
does not determine the level of payment (Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). Knowing this, the 
dominant strategy for participants is to place a bid equal to their own costs because the 
magnitude of the bid does not affect the payment that will be received - it will only affect 
the probability of winning. In this payment format winners will tend to receive a payment 
greater than their costs, eliminating the need to shade their bid in order to have a net gain 
from the auction. Therefore, the dominant strategy is to place a bid equal to costs in order 
to maximize the probability of winning.  
The price received under the uniform price format may be determined one of two 
ways: 1
st price, where the price is determined by the last accepted winner; or 2
nd price, 
where price is determined by the first rejected participant. Cason & Gangadharan (2004; 
2005) explain that the second price method may be more effective because when first 
price is being used, the last person to win will not receive a payment greater than their 
costs while other winners will. It is possible that the participant on the margin will tend to 
overbid and thus raise the universal market price making the overall auction more 
expensive and less efficient. Whereas using the second price method, all winners would 
receive a payment greater than their costs, thus reducing the incentive to place a bid 
greater than costs in order to obtain profit.  
There is debate as to which pricing rule is the most effective in an auction. In the 
literature there are two streams of evaluation of pricing rule effectiveness: 1) cost 
effectiveness (meaning minimizing the total cost of the auction and maximizing benefits 
procured from a fixed auction budget (i.e. budget spent per unit of EG&S)) and 2) ability 
to act as a cost discovery mechanism. The ability for the pricing rule to provide 
incentives for participants to bid their own costs is an important issue in an auction. 
Without the proper incentive, there may be strategic behaviour in order to maximize 
information rent by misrepresenting costs. In the event there is an abundance of cost 
shading, winners in the auction may not be appropriately chosen ultimately leading to a 
decrease in cost effectiveness.  
Discriminatory pricing has been found to possess characteristics which support 
better cost effectiveness than the uniform pricing method. Cason & Gangadharan have 
illustrated in their studies (2004; 2005) that discriminatory pricing leads to lower overall 
costs of conducting an auction than uniform pricing. The reason behind this is that under 
uniform pricing each winner will always receive a payment greater than their costs, and 
will therefore inflate program costs. 
The comparison of discriminatory and uniform payments in terms of cost 
effectiveness is dependent on the extent of rent seeking under a discriminatory 
framework. Since uniform payments will always pay more than the submitted bid, the 
optimal solution is to submit a bid equal to costs, but the overall monetary outlay will be 
greater than the summation of costs. If there is relatively low amounts of rent seeking in 
the discriminatory case, the payment per individual would be lower than with uniform 
payments; therefore more units of EG&S could be purchased because more bids could be 
accepted. If there is a relatively high amount of rent seeking under discriminatory   6
payments, then a higher proportion of the budget will be paid to fewer individuals thus 
reducing cost effectiveness.  
An important feature of a procurement auction is its ability to reveal the costs of 
participating individuals in order to combat the effect of asymmetric information. 
Theoretically speaking, uniform pricing would perform better at revealing the cost curve 
than discriminatory pricing based on the optimal bidding behaviour in each method. As 
was previously illustrated, bidders are more likely to shade their bids above their costs in 
order to maximize a potential profit; this of course results in a skewed revealed cost 
function. This has also been supported empirically using auction experiments (Cason & 
Gangadharan 2004; 2005).  
More research is required to understand the behaviour under each payment type, 
especially taking into consideration other factors such as learning, competition, and 
demographics. The decision on payment type must also take into account the individuals 
who are participating in the auction. If participants do not agree with the payment type 
chosen, there may be low levels of participation; or if there is a lack of understanding 
individuals may feel “cheated” by a poor result in the auction. Therefore, no matter what 
payment type is chosen, extension with relevant stakeholders is important so that there is 
a level of understanding of the mechanism.  
 
1.4.2  Budget and Target Constraints 
 
Conservation auctions can be run under one of two constraints: a budget 
constraint or a target (objective) constraint. Under a budget constraint winning bids are 
selected until a fixed budget is exhausted. The amount of EG&S acquired under such an 
auction is only known after the auction. A target based auction implies that there is a pre-
determined, fixed amount of EG&S (or other objective) to be gained from the auction 
process. In this case, the resulting budget is only known after the auction has been 
completed. Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi (2005) state that there is no reason to believe 
that one is better than the other, although, they also note that a budget constraint may 
create an environment which psychologically disciplines bidders to place bids closer to 
their costs. 
Very little research has been conducted in this area, since budgetary constraints 
are typically more important for governments and other funding agencies who support 
conservation auctions. However, with results-based management becoming more 
prevalent it is important to understand the effects of imposing an environmental target as 
a policy goal before establishing a budget. Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi (2005) found that 
in terms of cost efficiency there was no significant difference between the two constraint 
types, however this has not been verified in the literature. Ultimately it depends on the 
policy goals in place and how stringent a budget is. If limited budgets are a reality, a 
budget based auction would be suggested since the level of funding available for a project 
is known. If a specific environmental target is set, it would be preferable to have more 
money available since the end cost of the program is unknown.  
   7
1.4.3  Reserve Prices and Targets 
 
In the context of conservation auctions, a reserve price is the maximum amount to 
be paid for a unit of the good being traded (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). The 
reserve price serves as an alternative budget constraint if the auction environment is 
susceptible to factors which would decrease economic efficiency or cost effectiveness.  
  Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi (2005) identify two reasons to consider the use of a 
reserve price in an auction: 
•  The implementation of a reserve price contributes to the risk that a bidder may 
lose from bidding too high. This will increase bidder competition enabling the 
agency to gain from information rent that would have otherwise been 
transferred to the winning participants. It also eliminates the possibility of 
submitting unrealistically high (bogus) bids.  
•  The reserve price may also act as a price signal of the agency’s (or society’s) 
maximum willingness to pay for conservation services, thus somewhat 
representing the demand side of the conservation market. 
A reserve price would be appropriate if there is low competition among bidders; 
the possibility of collusive behaviour; to reduce the effects of bidder learning; to place a 
limit on the auctions winners’ gains from trade (i.e. information rent);  as well as 
spreading one budget across multiple auction rounds and ensuring their equivalency to 
maintain economic efficiency(Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). A reserve price is less 
important where auctions have a strict budget constraint, which is said to have an implicit 
reservation price.  
A reserve quantity is the maximum allowable bid accepted in reference to the 
amount of EG&S submitted (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). A reserve quantity is 
useful in situations where one (or very few) bids represent a large fraction of the 
objective being considered in the auction.  A reserve quantity is implemented to ensure 
fairness and equity among participants rather than improving cost-effectiveness or 
economic efficiency (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). For example, in the auction for 
Landscape Recovery in Western Australia, a bid which constituted a large fraction of the 
total area under the auction was rejected despite having a competitive $/ha cost in order 
to spread the budget among more participants (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005).  
In the event a reserve price or quantity is used in an auction, it may be announced 
or unannounced prior to the outset of the auction – much like a budget or target may be 
announced or left concealed prior to the auction. Although there was no literature 
available for review which explicitly investigated this question, lessons may be drawn 
from the practical use of auctions. With evidence from the CRP, announcing a reserve 
price may send signals to producers to submit bids roughly equal to that price; this effect 
would become more prevalent under repeated auctions (Reichelderfer & Boggess 1998).  
It is also anticipated that the effect of a reserve price may have different effects on 
bidder behaviour and cost-effectiveness under different pricing methods (i.e. 
discriminatory v. uniform pricing) and how the reserve price is incorporated into the rules 
of the auction.  However, no literature has been found to support this theory.  
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1.4.4 Information  Provision 
 
The level of information available to participants in the reverse auction can have 
implications on the auction outcome. Depending on the level of information, participants 
may be able to use it to their advantage to extract information rent. This leads to higher 
budgetary outlay, as well as the revelation of an augmented cost structure. Therefore, 
careful consideration is required when determining what information to provide to 
participants. Information has been broken down into two categories: budget and reserve 
prices, and goods and services attributes. The effect of learning and how it is influenced 
by information provision will also be discussed in this subsection.  
 
Budgets and Reserve Prices 
 Revealing  information  related to budgets and/or reserve prices is not advised. It 
can immediately send signals to bidders as to the price the program authority is willing to 
pay for EG&S. This could serve to exacerbate rent seeking behaviour on the part of 
bidders. This was observed in the CRP and documented by Reichelderfer and Boggess, 
(1988).  
 
Goods and Services Attributes 
  In the auction, administrators may choose to reveal to participants the amount of 
environmental assets they provide, and thus decrease the level of information asymmetry, 
or to keep it concealed. There are both advantages and disadvantages to revealing and 
concealing this type of information. Cason & Gangadharan (2004) identify that revealing 
information could lead to advantages such as an increase in “…perceived fairness and 
transparency in the auction…” (p.1212) as well as inform landowners about desired 
actions and thus encourages long-term investment into conservation practices.  However, 
revealing environmental information can encourage rent seeking and thus reduce 
economic efficiency.  
Chan et al. (2003) reasons that the optimal information policy depends on who 
holds the information about the EG&S on private land: landowners versus the program 
authority. Landowners are more likely to have private information pertaining to the 
environmental impact of their production (e.g. potential effects on particular tracts of land 
and or species (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005)). However, the program authority 
may have access to more detailed information of the ecological/environmental 
significance of their land and characteristics and how they match with policy goals and 
objectives (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005).
9  
If landowners hold detailed private information about the level of EG&S that 
could be provided by their actions, Chan et al. (2003) recommends that the scoring rules 
and relative weights (e.g. an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)
10) should be announced 
if quality can be accurately verified after the auction. Under this framework, landowners 
are able to bundle their attributes to best suit the program and increase their probability of 
                                                 
9 As per the assumption of information asymmetry between program authority and landowners 
10 An EBI is a scoring framework based on weighting EG&S (e.g. wildlife habitat, water quality 
improvements, carbon sequestration, etc) supplied in a project to meet an environmental goal. It is 
employed under the CRP to score submitted projects.    9
being selected. However, this could lead to over-paying for quality as landowners may 
exploit their information advantage and shade their bid above their costs (Chan et al. 
2003; Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). In the case where quality cannot be verified, 
there may be the problem of adverse selection and price competition over quality 
competition and subsequently the purchase of low quality EG&S (Chan et al. 2003). 
If the program authority has more information pertaining to the level of EG&S 
potential on bidders’ land, they have one of two choices: to reveal or not to reveal. If full 
information is revealed to landowners, there is incentive for bidders to extract 
information rent, especially for those who have desirable levels of EG&S (Chan et al. 
2003). If they only reveal the information related to the EBI it must be symmetrical 
among bidders. Bidders will then make predictions about the preferred EG&S qualities 
relative to their predictions of their own EG&S potential. Chan et al. (2003) stipulates 
that in this situation bidders will avoid price competition in order to maximize their profit 
potential.  
When the program authority does not reveal its private information about the 
EG&S, bidders will have to make their own assessment of their environmental quality 
and how it will meet the preferences of the authority. Because of this, bidding becomes 
more like guesswork due to the uncertainty of their EG&S provision, in addition to their 
cost considerations (Chan et al. 2003). This increased uncertainty will encourage 
participants to bid closer to their costs (lower than their bids in the previous scenarios) for 
all levels of EG&S in order to increase the chance of winning in the auction (Chan et al. 
2003). This reflects the situation described where there is information asymmetry 
between parties.  
Cason & Gangadharan (2004) tested the effect of information on bidding 
behaviour using laboratory auction experiments and manipulated the amount of 
information provided to participants as the primary treatment variable (i.e. in one 
treatment the environmental benefits information was revealed, and in the other treatment 
it was not). Their results revealed that when information was withheld from bidders, the 
bids were based upon their opportunity costs (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). 
However under the provision of environmental benefits information, bidders were more 
likely to misrepresent their costs, especially those with high levels of benefits. The budget 
spent was higher, and the amount of environmental units purchased was lower; thus a 
reduction in auction efficiency was realized with the information revelation. This may be 
because with high benefits participants know that they would be prioritized in the 
auction, and therefore behave strategically to get the highest profit possible.  
There may also be long run advantages to revealing information. According to 
Stoneham et al. (2003), full disclosure of environmental asset information to participants 
sends signals to participants as to the priorities for the program authority. This provides 
participants with an opportunity and incentive to invest in conservation activities, and/or 
bundle specific assets or activities in order to increase their probability of being selected 
in the auction.  
Since the level of information to provide is a decision made before the auction 
process, the program authority must first weigh its different policy objectives and goals. 
There should also be some consideration as to who would hold the most amounts of 
significant information regarding EG&S.   
   10
1.4.5 Learning 
 
Another aspect of information provision is that which is learned over time by 
participants. After each auction round, bidders acquire some information based on the 
auction outcomes. Depending on their auction outcome, the bidder may choose to exploit 
this information by adjusting their bid accordingly to further their success in the auction 
and/or to increase the level of rent extraction.  
The level of learning is contingent on the amount of information announced after 
each auction round. Any information provided could be used to send signals to bidders 
and aid in bid adjustment to improve their gains from trade or accelerate the rate of 
learning. Essentially the same behaviour as described above concerning information 
given before the auction would result; i.e. promotion of rent seeking.  
Hailu et al. (2003) used agent based modeling
11 to assess the effect of 30 repeated 
auctions on learning and auction efficiency. They stated that while learning may be 
evident in an auction, the level of competition may be able to combat the effect and thus 
maintain auction efficiency. In the model, a learning algorithm which enforces a direction 
on bid adjustment based on previous auction outcomes was imposed
12. They found that 
auction efficiency does in fact erode over repeated auction rounds when learning is 
accounted for.  
Hailu et al. (2003) explains that when learning occurs, participants with 
previously successful bids or feedback exploit this information by experimenting with bid 
mark-ups. Through the process of learning and adjustment of bids, the accepted bidders 
mark their bids up to where they equate the first unsuccessful bid. This results in 
decreasing environmental benefits being procured per budgetary outlay over each auction 
round.  
Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi (2007) also encountered learning in an auction 
experiment using human subjects. The result of learning over three auction periods was 
also a decrease in auction efficiency due to increasing rates of rent extraction. Learning 
was also documented in the CRP program, which resulted in individuals just inside of 
acceptance increasing their bids to equate the cut-off bid price (Reichelderfer and 
Boggess, 1988).  
  In order to prevent this characteristic of repeated auctions, Hailu et al. (2003) 
suggests altering the rules (e.g. imposing reserve price, adjusting reserve price) of the 
auctions slightly between rounds or after a certain number of rounds in order to maintain 
a sense of information asymmetry between the bidders and the auctioneer. This will limit 
the amount for time infra-marginal bids to converge to the margin or reserve price.  
  However, the only documentation for learning in the literature has been in 
reference to discriminatory price auctions. This payment method encourages rent seeking 
                                                 
11 An agent based model is a computer based model simulating the actions and interactions of individuals or 
collectives and assessing the effects on the system as a whole 
12 Learning algorithm developed by Roth & Erev and Erev & Roth; it is widely accepted in psychology 
literature (Hailu & Schilizzi). The learning rule is as follows (as written in Hailu & Schilizzi): 
1)  If an agent wins a contract in the previous auction, it will maintain the same bid or increment it by 
10% 
2)  If an agent loses in the previous auction, it will maintain the same bid or lower it by 10% 
3)  Bids do not go below own opportunity costs   11
in the first place, and repeated auctions create an environment where the rate of rent 
seeking can increase over time with few ramifications. Although not yet supported by 
literature, it is possible that uniform pricing would be more robust under repeated auction 
rounds. There is no incentive for the last individual selected to increase their bid to equate 
the first unsuccessful bid, since any increase in a bid could compromise the chance of 
winning an auction.  
 
1.5 Other  Considerations 
 
While the design of the auction itself is very important to efficiency, there are 
other matters that affect auction efficiency that lie outside of the design. Acts of collusion 
or moral hazard (where an individual who is not subject to risk of being caught may 
behave differently than they would if they were fully subject to the risk of being caught) 
are social considerations that can greatly erode the efficiency of the auction. Like most 
individuals, producers are profit maximizing entities and are willing to act in a way that 
does in fact maximize profit even in the auction framework.  
Collusion in a conservation auction occurs when participants in an auction are 
able to communicate with each other, learn each other’s valuation, speculate on the 
auctioneers’ valuation, and subsequently fix the price that winners would receive to 
extract as much profit as possible. When a higher percentage of the budget is going 
towards giving profit, less EG&S can be purchased and ultimately the cost effectiveness 
of the auction is compromised.  
Collusion is especially a concern for conservation auctions because the bidders 
are not monitored during the bid construction process and are therefore liable to consult 
with neighbours and other participants. The friendly relationship between neighbours also 
establishes a level of trust between participants. Trust can be an important factor in 
collusion to ensure that the other party will follow through with discussed obligations.  
Unfortunately, little can be done to prevent social networking and collusion in the 
auction unless there is strict monitoring, which is not a desirable solution. However, 
methods to address rent seeking can be applied in order to reduce the negative effect of 
collusion on efficiency. Auction rules could be altered between auction sign-ups. This 
will limit the extent previous information can be used to collude for the next round. 
Reserve prices will also control for extremely high bids.  
Moral hazard is the event when a party does not follow through with contracted 
obligations. In the case of conservation auctions, moral hazard would occur if a 
participant was accepted in the auction to provide EG&S, received a payment, and later 
decided not to follow through with the project and did not provide any EG&S. The 
motivation for moral hazard is that when no project is undertaken, the auction payment is 
100% profit since no costs would be incurred. 
 To address moral hazard, one method is to provide a group contract to a given set 
of producers to provide EG&S and provide individual bonus payments if a group EG&S 
target is achieved; if the target is not achieved there will be no bonus payment. Therefore 
if a member of the group decides that they do not wish to continue with the project, the 
group has a smaller chance of achieving the target and receiving a bonus payment. Self-  12
regulation of the group would then be imposed because there is incentive to make sure 
everyone abides by their contract.  
 
1.6 Auctions  in  Manitoba 
 
  In order to address some of the environmental issues transpiring in Manitoba, 
there has been some investigation of MBIs; conservation auctions are an option that is 
being explored. In response, a series of workshops were developed in order to provide 
awareness to relevant stakeholders (e.g. government, producers, non-government 
organizations, industry), and to acquire feedback on their suitability in Manitoba. 
 
1.7  Purpose and Objectives 
 
  The purpose of the series of workshops held March 8 to March 19, 2010 was to 
create awareness of the conservation auction process and how it applies to the provision 
of EG&S by producers in Manitoba; moreover it was an opportunity to receive feedback 
on the applicability of auctions in Manitoba.  
  The objectives for this series of workshops are as follows: 
•  Determine the opinions of relevant stakeholders in regards to the relevance of 
auctions in Manitoba 
•  Investigate auction design features such as payment type, competition, and 
communication 
•  Conduct light economic analysis of the results of the auction simulations used 
in the workshops as education 
2  Workshop Results - Overall Statistics 
 
  In total 13 workshops were completed between the dates of March 8, 2010 and 
March 19, 2010. Originally 15 sessions were scheduled; however due to limited 
attendance some sessions were combined. Seven of the 13 workshops were held in 
Winnipeg in the Animal Industry Building, five were in Brandon in the Agriculture 
Centre, and one was held in Portage la Prairie in the Provincial building. Those who were 
in attendance had varying occupations: government employees, members of non-
government organizations (e.g. conservation districts, Ducks Unlimited Canada, Delta 
Waterfowl, Manitoba Habitat Heritage Corporation, etc), students, professors, and 
producers. An attempt was made to have each group homogenous in terms of occupation; 
however this was not always possible because of extenuating circumstances and 
scheduling. Originally, the auction simulations were designed to include 12 participants. 
However, again due to extenuating circumstances, sessions were not filled to the required 
12, so adjustments were made. The number of participants varied from 6 to 12 (Table 1). 
As a result of the varying number of participants, an attempt was made to amend the 
available auction budget to reflect the same level of competition as in the case of 12 
participants. Since the final numbers per session were usually finalized the day of, it was   13
difficult to accurately determine the budget while maintaining the integrity of the supply 
curve. Therefore, the original budget
13 based on 12 participants was used for most of the 
sessions (see Table 1).  
Four treatments were used during the series of workshops based upon those 
conducted at the University of Alberta. They considered the payment structure, 
discriminatory and uniform; and ranking strategies, maximizing coverage (the number of 
wetland acres) bought in the auction or maximizing kg of phosphorus abated in the 
auction. Since environmental information, like phosphorus abatement, is not easily 
acquired; we would like to see if wetland acreage, a metric more readily available, could 
act as a substitute. Therefore the treatments were maximize coverage discriminatory 
(MCD), maximize coverage uniform (MCU), maximize phosphorus abated 
discriminatory (MPD), and maximize phosphorus abated uniform (MPU). Overall we had 
the following repititions: 4 MCU, 3 MCD, 3 MPU, and 3 MPD. An additional MCU 
treatment was run in order to fill the odd spot. It was also selected to appeal to the 
producer participants in that session. Otherwise, all other sessions were predetermined 
and did not relate to the type of group participating.  
  
Table 1 Treatments log for Manitoba workshops from March 8, 2010 to March 19, 2010 
Date Location  Treatment* Participants Budget  ($) 
March 8-pm  Winnipeg  MCU_1  12  62,218.65
March 9-am  Winnipeg  MCD_1  9  62,218.65
March 9-pm  Winnipeg  MCD_2  9  62,218.65
March 10-am  Winnipeg  MCU_2  8  45,377.23
March 10-pm  Winnipeg  MPU_1  11  62,218.65
March 15-am  Winnipeg  MCD_3  8  29,860.80
March 15-pm  Winnipeg  MPU_2  7  44,772.15
March 16-am  Brandon  MCU_3  9  62,218.65
March 16-pm  Brandon  MPD_1  7  62,218.65
March 17 pm  Portage 
la Prairie  MPU_3 8  62,218.65
March 18-am  Brandon  MPD_2  6  62,218.65
March 18-pm  Brandon  MPD_3  6  62,218.65
March 19 am  Brandon  MCU_4  9  62,218.65
*MC – Maximize Coverage 
 U – Uniform payments 
 # - Repetition 
MP – Maximize phosphorus abatement 
D – Discriminatory payments 
 
  
  Each auction simulation session consisted of 10 independent auction rounds in 
order to observe the evolution of bidding behavior over time. It has been found that real 
conservation auctions have been run more than once for the same set of goods (e.g. CRP 
has operational for over 20 years). Because of these repeated sign-ups there is potential 
for bidders to learn and subsequently extract more profit from the auction (as described in 
Section 1.4.5). Therefore it is important to understand how bids evolve with repeated 
signups.  
                                                 
13 The budget for 12 participants was $62,218.65. This was calculated based on the former National Farm 
Stewardship Payment structure where 50% of wetland restoration costs would be covered. Costs were 
therefore summed for all 12 model farms and divided in half and to assume that this would be the amount 
of money the government would be willing to pay for wetland restoration.    14
3 Economic  Analysis 
 
As these workshops were being used primarily as a tool to provide awareness and 
receive feedback from stakeholders, the results of the auctions most likely do not reflect 
real behaviour; therefore caution and scrutiny should be used when interpreting the 
results. The following bullet points outline issues contributing to errors that occurred: 
•  Participants were allowed to communicate. Communication was mostly used as a 
tool to aide each other through the exercise. Collusive behaviour was often 
discussed, however it was only achieved once in one period.  
•  The incentive mechanism chosen may have been weak in inducing participants to 
place rational and serious bids. The incentive was a $50 gift card at a retail store 
or restaurant. Those who displayed rational choices were entered into a draw to 
win a gift card
14. Incentives were provided for select participants (e.g. non-
government employees), and it was apparent that the lack of incentives resulted in 
“playing a game”. For those participants who were eligible, the incentive may not 
have been sufficient.  
•  Throughout the workshops many participants commented that the auctions lack 
realism and therefore may not have taken the simulations seriously.  
•  Inconsistent number of participants. 
•  Different budget for some sessions. 
 
Despite the discrepancies listed above, lessons may still be learned from the 
results. Tables 2 and 3 display descriptive statistics from the simulation auctions. Table 2 
shows the mean levels of the budget spent, summation of costs of winners, rent paid, 
number of farmers receiving a payment, and number of wetlands acres and kg of 
phosphorus abated. The mean is a general statistic of comparison across the entire 10 
rounds of each session. It does not take into account the fluctuations that would occur 
over the rounds.  
The average range of wetland acres achieved under the auction was from 17.00 to 
38.77 acres and the average range of kg of P abated was between 170.80 to 228.80 kg P 
as seen in Table 2. The highest average level of wetland acres was acquired in MCU1 
with 38.77 acres which equates to 220 kg P abated with a budget of $62,218.65. The 
highest average level of kg P abated was found in MCD1 treatment with 229 kg P which 
equated to 34.36 wetland acres also with a budget of $62,218.65. Generally, when the 
budget was higher (e.g. $62,218.65) more wetland acres and kg P abated were acquired 
than when the budget was lower.  
The level of rent seeking, or payments made above costs, was dependant both on 
the available budget as well as the number of participants in the auction
15. The highest 
average amount of rent seeking was found in MPU3 with $23,532.77 followed by MPD2 
with $21,958.19. This translates to roughly 48% and 44% of the budget going towards 
rent as seen in Table 2. MPU3 being a uniform treatment, one may assume that there 
were higher market prices in this treatment than other treatments. In fact, in this session 
there was collusion to raise the market price among the participants in Round 6. MPD2 
                                                 
14 Two gift cards were available in 2 sessions because of the cancellations 
15 Figures comparing budget and rent over all rounds are provided in the Appendix   15
had very limited competition with only 6 registered participants with the full $62,218.65 
budget. In this case participants were able to learn from auction results in each round and 
push their bids up continuously until they were not accepted. However, in the second 
repetition with only 6 participants, the average level of rent seeking was not as high. This 
may be attributed to the type of participants in each group. The group in MPD2 consisted 
of NGOs and two producers, while MPD3 was comprised of government and three 
producers. Therefore, demographics may have an effect as well as individual 
characteristics. 
In the sessions MCU1 and MCU4, there was a negative average level of rent 
seeking of $-5,603.91 and $-2,125.57 respectively. This indicates that some individuals 
were bidding below their costs and would subsequently receive a payment that was below 
their costs. There is no direct reason for this occurrence other than the individuals might 
not have understood the auction concept, or they were testing the auction mechanism. 
Also the MCU1 session was comprised of MAFRI employees who were not eligible for 
the gift card incentive, which may have contributed to the negative rent figure because 
participants were behaving as if playing a game as opposed to a real auction with 
financial consequences.  
  In Table 2 you can see the percentage of the budget spent in the auction. Since the 
auction is designed to not pay out above the fixed budget, the budget is never fully 
exhausted. Based on the results summarized, there does not appear to be a direct link 
between the budget spent and the % rent with the available budget or number of 
participants over the entire 10 rounds of each. There may be more specific effects when 
considering each round of each session.  
  
Table 2 Summary of simulation auction budgets, the percent of budget spent and the percentage of 
the budget that went towards economic rent 
Treatment Participants Budget  ($) 
% 
Budget 
Spent  % Rent 
MCD1  9  62,218.65 85.08 8.62
MCD2  9 62,218.65 75.34 2.48
MCD3  8  29,860.80 66.92 4.53
MCU1  12 62,218.65 85.22 -10.57
MCU2  8  45,377.23 80.60 20.10
MCU3  9 62,218.65 84.76 12.67
MCU4  9  62,218.65 70.16 -4.87
MPD1  7 62,218.65 83.23 14.12
MPD2  6  62,218.65 80.14 44.04
MPD3  6 62,218.65 81.11 4.95
MPU1  11  62,218.65 89.55 21.56
MPU2  7 44,772.15 83.79 19.32
MPU3  8  62,218.65 79.40 47.64
 
From the data gathered, the revealed supply curves could be constructed for every 
session and round to see if the auction can be used as a cost discovery mechanism. The 
revealed supply curve also gives an indication of the overall cost effectiveness and 
success of the auction. Figures 1 and 2 represent two extreme cases of the effectiveness 
of auction results. Each figure compares the real supply curve with the revealed supply   16
curve from auction round 1, 5, and 10. By looking at the progression of the supply curve 
over the rounds we can observe the occurrence of learning or not. Figure 1 was from the 
results of MCD1 held on March 9, 2010; there were 9 participants and the budget was 
$62,218.65. As you can see in the figure the auction was fairly successful in revealing the 
real supply curve given that the curves are very close to each other. There is evidence of 
some rent seeking, but it is fairly minimal compared to other auctions. Figure 2 was from 
the results of MPD2 held on March 18, 2010; there were 6 participants and the budget 
was also $62,218.65. This figure represents the extreme case of rent seeking which is 
represented by the large gap between the real supply curve and the revealed curves. The 
revealed supply curve is also increasing over the rounds (e.g. revealed supply from round 
10 is above the revealed supply from round 1) indicating that participants are raising their 
bids after each round. This gives clear evidence of learning on behalf of the participants: 
participants would raise their bids, and based on their acceptance or rejection the 
individual would adjust his or her bid accordingly to either increase and extract more 
rent, or decrease to be accepted. 
  Comparing these two figures can give light to the effect competition can have on 
the outcomes of an auction
16. When there were 9 participants (Figure 1) the curves are 
fairly close, this indicates that there was little room for rent seeking most likely because 
increasing a bid would result in the rejection of an offer. With 6 participants (Figure 2) 
there was more room to increase bids and still be accepted. This is because there was 
relatively more money on the table with only 6 bidders instead if 9; i.e. less competition. 
As a result of less competition, more money is being paid to rent instead of purchasing 
EG&S, which can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. Therefore, it is not enough to have a high 
budget for the purchase of EG&S, there must also be an ample amount of competition to 
ensure that the budget is being spent wisely.  
 
                                                 
16 Despite the scales being different (e.g. acres v. kg P) the two figures can still be compared on a relative 
basis in terms of supply curve revelation   17
Table 3 Descriptive statistics from auction simulations 










Acres  # kg P 
Mean  52937.40  48373.73  4563.67 5.20  34.36  228.80 
MCD1  9  62,218.65 
Std. Deviation  3877.78  4038.96  3626.92 1.03  2.50  32.09 
Mean  46872.90 45710.85  1162.05 4.50 31.38  209.60 
MCD2  9 62,218.65  Std. Deviation  11930.81 11263.89  5250.76 1.08 6.48  32.51 
Mean  19983.63  19077.86  905.76 1.60  14.42  97.60 
MCD3  8  29,860.80  Std. Deviation  4557.72  5449.58  1985.34 0.52  3.63  32.26 
Mean  53022.34 58625.25  -5602.91 4.30 38.77  219.90 
MCU1  12 62,218.65  Std. Deviation  6420.62 8178.01 7268.92 1.42 3.85  52.78 
Mean  36574.21  29222.27  7351.94 3.50  21.95  144.80 
MCU2  8  45,377.23  Std. Deviation  5992.78  5253.00  1336.15 0.53  4.13  31.73 
Mean  52738.66 46057.68  6680.98 4.20 33.84  210.70 
MCU3  9 62,218.65  Std. Deviation  7779.63 7870.69 6154.83 0.63 4.67  31.10 
Mean  43649.66  45775.24  -2125.57 3.20  31.58  181.80 
MCU4  9  62,218.65  Std. Deviation  10952.98  14722.79  4974.05 0.63  7.60  27.45 
Mean  51787.22 44475.40  7311.81 4.80 29.81  221.10 
MPD1  7 62,218.65  Std. Deviation  6304.47 8879.01 8621.11 0.63 5.74  30.08 
Mean  49861.40  27903.21  21958.19 3.70  20.22  137.60 
MPD2  6  62,218.65  Std. Deviation  6764.56  2244.13  6176.79 0.48  1.59  16.42 
Mean  50467.07 47968.65  2498.42 3.50 30.62  170.80 
MPD3  6 62,218.65  Std. Deviation  6981.97 16929.88 12106.02 0.85 9.12  30.01 
Mean  55716.16  43702.22  12013.94 6.70  29.02  234.70 
MPU1  11  62,218.65  Std. Deviation  6854.46  4490.71  2716.97 0.48  3.08  27.80 
Mean  37513.42 30264.06  7249.37 2.90 20.35  165.70 
MPU2  7 44,772.15  Std. Deviation  9232.47 6133.62 3455.62 0.32 5.32  32.70 
Mean  49400.68 25867.91 23532.77 4.10 17.00 131.80 



















Real Supply Period 1 Period 5 Period 10
 
Figure 1 Real supply curve compared with revealed supply curves based on bidding in Round 1, 5, 


















Real Supply Period 1 Period 5 Period 10
 
Figure 2 Real supply curve compared with revealed supply curves based on bidding in Round 1, 5, 
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4 Survey  Results 
 
  At the conclusion of every workshop, participants were asked to complete an 
anonymous survey regarding their opinion on the workshop itself, as well as on 
conservation auctions and their use in Manitoba for EG&S contracts. The survey has 
been provided in the Appendix. While the survey was provided to all participants, some 
questions were directed at producers because of their vital role in the provision of EG&S. 
  The responses were copied into an electronic spreadsheet and analyzed using 
SPSS 15.0 statistics software.  Overall there were 108 responses to the survey. Not every 
question was provided with an answer, especially those questions with multiple 
components (e.g. Q 8b and Q 13a). There were 6 occupation types represented in the 
workshops: Government (Manitoba and federal), NGO, producers, professors, students, 
and industry (see Table 4). Some individuals, who were not producers, stated that they 
did have a farm operation. These individuals were not taken into account when 
quantifying producer responses since they do not farm full-time.  
 




   22  Government 
crop  1 
Industry     1 
   4  NGO 
livestock  2 
Producer livestock  1 
Professor     3 
   4 
Female 
Student 
livestock  1 
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crop  2 
Government 
livestock  3 
Industry livestock  1 
   8 
livestock  2 
NGO 
mixed  1 
   2 
crop  4 
livestock  10 
Producer 
mixed  8 
Professor     3 
Male 
Student     1 
 
  The first 6 questions of the survey assessed opinions of the workshops 
themselves. The majority of participants enjoyed participating in the workshops and felt 
that they learned something. However, some expressed that there was room for 
improvement in the future, especially to make the workshops more realistic. Some   20
suggested holding more workshops to work more with producers to increase extension 
efforts to educate on the auction process, as well as assist with cost determination.  
   The second portion of the survey, Q7-Q13, pertained to environmental 
programming in Manitoba.  
 
Q.7 – Do you currently participate in an environmental program? Yes/No; If yes, 
what program are you a part of and why did you choose to participate? 
 
The majority of producers who participated in the workshops currently participate 
in environmental programming, accounting for 88%. The types of programs are as 
follows: Environmental Farm Plan (EFP), Enhanced Environmental Farm Plan, 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), Environmental Farm Action Program (EFAP), 
Beneficial Management Practices, conservation agreements, conservation agreements 
specifically with Manitoba Habitat Heritage Corporation (MHHC), and the Wetland 
Restoration Incentive Program (WRIP), or they were unsure. Environmental or 
conservation concerns were the primary reason for participating in these programs as well 
as being eligible for payments.  
 
Q.8a – Would you participate in an auction for any practice if it was offered? 
 
  When asked if they would participate in an auction for any practice, 60% of 
producers questioned would participate, 32% would not participate, and 6% were unsure. 
The main reasons for participating were not listed (e.g. no response) however, many 
stated that they would participate as a learning experience (both in the auction process as 
well as a chance to evaluate costs), or because there is potential to earn a profit. The main 
reason for not participating was because the auction was not seen as a fair mechanism for 
producers; either it would encourage competition and put neighbour against neighbour or 
it would not benefit those who are conservationally minded but those who have had bad 
practices in the past and that are now being paid to clean up their act. The responses from 
the other occupation groups were not considered as this question was directed for the 
opinion of producers.  
 
Q.8b – If you answered yes above [8a], would you participate in an auction for any 
of the following BMPs: Forage conversion, zero tillage, holding pond installation, 
wetland restoration, wetland conservation, and other? 
 
  The preferred practice to be used in the auction, among all participants who 
responded to this question, was wetland conservation with 45.3% of “Yes” votes (Table 
5). This falls in line with the general sentiments of most participants in the workshops, 
that conservation activities should be considered first for any environmental program 
instead of restoration, or other “band-aid solutions”. The next preferred practice was 
wetland restoration at 37.7%. The only practice that individuals seemed to be opposed to 
was zero tillage with 18% of respondents voting “No”. Other practices that were 
recognized were afforestation, winter-site management, habitat protection, native prairie 
grassland restoration/conservation, riparian area management, forest land management, 
phytoremediation, grazing management, grassed runway, variable rate precision farming,   21
intercropping, and carbon sequestration. Two respondents also stated that they would 
participate in any practice.  
 
Table 5 Summary of all responses from Q.8b, the preferred BMP practices to be delivered in an 
auction 
Practice Response  Count  Percent 
No 9  8.5%  Forage 
Conversion  Yes 36 34.0% 
No 18 17.0%  Zero Till 
Yes 27 25.5% 
No 10 9.4%  Holding 
Pond 
Installation 
Yes 36 34.0% 
No 7  6.6%  Wetland 
Restoration  Yes 40 37.7% 
No 3  2.8% 
Unsure 1  0.9% 
Wetland 
Conservation 
Yes 48 45.3% 
 
  Among producers, the preferred practice to deliver an auction for would be 
wetland conservation, with 48% (Table 6). This was followed by forage conversion and 
holding pond installation with 36% and wetland restoration with 32%. Like the overall 
statistics, the highest percentage of “No” votes was associated with zero tillage. This may 
be because this is already a common practice being implemented by producers or an 
indication that the practice of zero till may not have the same benefits as other practices. 
One person stated that they would require more information in order to make a decision. 
Wetland restoration is less preferred by producers than by the entire amalgamation of 
participants because there are fewer benefits and more costs of restoration to producers 
than to other groups. There is also a stigma around wetlands in agriculture. This has been 
a challenge for policy makers in Manitoba who realize that wetlands have the ability to 
provide much EG&S.  
 
Table 6 Summary of producer responses from Q.8b, preferred BMP practices to be delivered in an 
auction 
Practice Response  Count  Percent 
No 1  4.0%  Forage 
conversion  Yes 9  36.0% 
No 5  20.0%  Zero Tillage 
Yes 6  24.0% 
Holding pond 
installation 
Yes 9  36.0% 
No 2  8.0%  Wetland 
Restoration  Yes 8  32.0% 
No 1  4.0%  Wetland 
Conservation  Yes 12  48.0% 
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Q.9 – In general, would you know your costs (farm parameters) associated with any 
of the abovementioned practices [from 8b]? 
 
  A concern that was brought up in the workshops was that producers would not 
participate in an auction because they would not know their costs and therefore could not 
structure bids appropriately. However 80% of producers stated that they would know 
their costs for the BMPs that they had chosen in question 8b. Some participants stated on 
the questionnaire that it would depend on the particular practice being considered. This 
result is encouraging since there has been speculation if producers would in fact be able 
to estimate their costs.  
 
Q.10 – Do you think that an auction would be an effective tool to deliver incentive 
programs in Manitoba to support agricultural producers in reducing identified 
environmental risks and improving the management of agricultural land? 
 
Figure 3 Breakdown of responses by occupation for Q.10 asking “Do you think that an auction would 
be an effective tool to deliver incentive programs in Manitoba to support agricultural producers in 
reducing identified environmental risks and improving the management of agricultural land?”   23
  The statistics show that 50.9% of the respondents stated “Yes”, it would be an 
effective tool; while 26.4% said “No” it would not be an effective tool; 14.2% were 
unsure; and 8.5% gave no response. Breaking down the responses by occupation type, 
there is a clear indication that only certain groups are in favour of the auction mechanism 
(Figure 3). Government, NGOs, students, and professors were all in favour of the 
mechanism by more than 50%.  The reasons of being in favour of the program were that 
it would provide benefits to producers, it’s cost effective, it can act as a cost discovery 
mechanism, and it would be a good mechanism with extension. Producers had a very 
high “No” response at 56%. A majority of the respondents felt that it would generally be 
a bad program for producers because it would be unfair, and they did not like the 
competitive nature of auctions. However, some did recognize that there was potential for 
monetary and environmental benefits arising from the auction. There was a 50:50 split 
between participants representing Industry, however there were only 2 respondents, 
therefore this result may not be a reliable representation.    
    
Q.11 – Do you think that an auction would be an effective tool for providing 
incentives to induce more restoration of wetlands?   
Question 10 was then re-worded to specifically address the applicability of the 
conservation auction tool with wetland restoration. There was a strong positive response 
with 62.3% of the votes indicating “Yes” for a wetland restoration auction (Figure 4). It 
is interesting that there were more “Yes” votes in the case of wetland restoration, since 
wetland restoration was generally not a preferable practice among the participants. 
 
Figure 4 Breakdown of responses from all participants for Q.11 asking “Do you think that an auction 
would be an effective tool for providing incentives to induce more restoration of wetlands?”    24
 
  Taking into consideration the breakdown of the responses by occupation, you can 
see that the increase in yes responses was actually from more producers where 56% of 
producers answered “Yes” (Figure 5). This is a very interesting finding considering that 
previous answers suggest that producers were A) not in favour of auctions, and B) not in 
favour of wetland restoration. This result may be an artifact of the workshop itself since 
the simulations were focused on wetland restoration. Generally most occupations were 
highly in favour of an auction for wetland restoration, especially students and professors 
with 83.3% and NGOs with 70.6% (Figure 5). Similar reasons for votes were expressed 
in this question as in Q.10 (e.g. auctions are unfair and competitive, but there is potential 
for the cost effective procurement of EG&S). 
  
 
Figure 5 Breakdown of responses by occupation for Q.11.  
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Q.12 – Would you participate in an actual auction aimed at wetland restoration if it 
was offered? 
 
  This question was also specifically aimed at producers given that they are the 
demographic that would be providing wetlands through restoration projects on their land. 
Of the participants in the workshops, 60% indicated that they would not participate in an 
auction for wetland restoration mostly because they did not have suitable land for 
restoration projects or their land was not drained. The 36% who said that they would 
participate stated that it was for private (e.g. land already too wet for production, profit 
from payment) and environmental benefits. The remaining 4 % were unsure, and would 
require further information and questioned how restoration would affect their operation.  
  
Q.13 – A) What contract length would you agree to if you were going to restore 
wetlands: annual, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, permanent, other? B) What is the 
maximum contract length you would consider?  
  
The responses from all participants are presented in Figure 6. Most people who 
completed this question preferred a 5 year contract for wetland restoration (with 38.7% 
voting “Yes”). Based on anecdotal observation of this question, 5 years is a close 
estimate with one crop rotation. It was also mentioned that beyond a 5 year time period it 
would become increasingly difficult to estimate costs and predict the market. Under a 5 
year contract there is still some flexibility, whereas anything longer might impose regret 
if the markets swing in favour of the producer (e.g. relevant commodity markets). Ten 
years was the next preferred contract length with about 35%.  Other contract lengths that 
could be agreed to were 3 or 4 years, which reflects a crop rotation.   
  Considering only producers responses, the preferred contract length was actually 
10 years with 40% voting “Yes” (Figure 7). This may be an indication that a longer 
contract may provide more stability if the payment was adequate to cover that length of 
time. As would be expected, permanent contracts were strongly disliked by producers 
with 32% stating “No”. However, some stated that a permanent conservation easement 
would have potential for some land that has permanent wetlands because it would be 
difficult and expensive to drain. Many stated in the survey as well as in discussion that 
the contract length would be dependent on the level of payment being offered.  
  It should be noted that this question had a lower response rate, or the question was 
not completed as expected so the statistics may not accurately reflect the opinions of the 
participants. It is felt that individuals would select the contract length that they would like 
(i.e. giving “Yes” votes) however, “No” votes were not always provided. It may be 
argued that a “No response” could be considered “No” but it may not be appropriate to 
make such assumptions here.  
Part B of Q.13 was included to determine the maximum contract length that a 
participant would feel comfortable signing as opposed to the preferred contract length in 
part A. Again, the response rate was lower for this question; therefore the statistics may 
not accurately reflect the participants’ opinions (Figure 8). Based on all of the 
participants, the maximum contract lengths preferred varied from 3 years to a permanent 
contract, the most common being 10 years followed by permanent. A majority of the 
permanent responses were from NGOs, indicating that they would prefer permanent   26
contracts in order to guarantee the longevity of restoration projects. However, 16% of 
producers indicated that they would also be willing to consider a permanent contract for 



























Figure 6 Breakdown of responses from all participants for Q.13a asking “What contract length 


























Figure 7 Breakdown from producers for Q.13a 
 






























Figure 8 Breakdown of responses from all participants for Q.13b asking “What is the maximum 
contract length you would consider?” 
 
The final 4 questions were designed to ask questions specifically about opinions 
of the auction mechanism and design, as the previous questions were based on 
environmental programming. This way we can have a better idea if the mechanism is 
appropriate for use in Manitoba. The participants were first primed with a description of 
the two payment types: “There are two different way to give out payments; 
discriminatory where you are paid what you bid, and uniform where everyone receives 
the same unit price (which is equal to the unit price of the first rejected bid [and] 
therefore is larger than your own unit price)”. 
 
Q.14 – Please circle the payment type that was used in the session you participated 
in today: Discriminatory, Uniform 
 
  This was included to know which payment type the participants had experienced 
in the workshop. This was announced during the workshop, as well as while the survey 
was being completed. Generally, individuals were more familiar with discriminatory 
pricing than uniform, because it is more related to conventional auctions. Typically those 
experiencing the uniform treatment would have a better grasp of the pricing mechanism 
as the auction session progressed.  
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Q.15 – Which payment type would you prefer to receive in a real auction? Why? 
 
  Figure 9 illustrates the relationship between what payment type the participants 
experienced (Q.14) and their subsequent choice of a preferred payment type. The bars 
indicate the percentage of people choosing the preferred type, uniform or discriminatory, 
given their experience in a workshop with one payment type. Based on the figure you can 
see that the experienced payment type does have a slight influence (but not significant) 
on the choice of the preferred method since there is no clear favoured payment type 
despite the experience. Participants slightly preferred the payment type they had 
experienced by about 2% for both uniform and discriminatory.  
It is also believed that there may be an emotional aspect to this response. Given 
the observed discussion by certain individuals, it is possible that if a participant had a 
farm that was not cost-effective at providing EG&S (i.e. less likely to be accepted in the 
auction) they would attribute their “poor” performance to the payment type and deem it 
as unfair; therefore they would choose the other payment type by default.  
The reasons for choosing a payment structure were grouped into 5 categories: cost 
effectiveness, fairness (for producers and/or public), price/profit, not fair (for producers 
and/or public), and heterogeneity (recognizing that producers are heterogeneous). Cost 
effectiveness refers to the ability to stretch a budget to purchase more units of EG&S.  
Fairness had two meanings depending on the pricing method it was being referred to. In 
the context of discriminatory, fair meant that producers would be paid appropriately 
according to their costs, instead of some farmers getting a large profit margin just 
because they are more cost effective.  It was also easier to understand, as producers know 
their end payments. In the context of uniform, fairness meant that all producers were 
treated equally by being offered the same price, and that it “evens the playing field”. 
Price/profit meant that there was an opportunity to make some extra money from the 
auction. Not fair also had different meanings depending on the payment type. Not fair 
under discriminatory meant that you are unable to win as often, while under uniform it 
referred to high cost producers being paid the same as low cost producers. Heterogeneity 
was more specific to discriminatory pricing in that it recognizes that producers are not all 
the same in terms of production or in their ability to provide EG&S.  
The frequencies of responses are provided in Table 7. If discriminatory pricing 
was experienced, the most common reasons for preferring discriminatory were that it was 
fair and recognized the heterogeneity of producers, while the most common response for 
preferring uniform was also because it was fair (66.7% of the people choosing uniform 
had this response). If the uniform treatment was experienced in the workshop, the most 
common reason for preferring discriminatory was because of heterogeneity, fairness, and 
cost effectiveness. The most common reason for preferring the uniform payment method 
was because it was fair.  















































Figure 9 Breakdown of responses by occupation for Q.14 asking “Which payment type would you 
prefer to receive in a real auction?” 
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Table 7 Summary of the responses of all participants indicating their preferred payment type and 











n/a 5  71.4% 
Heterogeneity 1  14.3% 
No response 
Price/profit 1  14.3% 
No response  6  31.6% 
Cost Effective  2  10.5% 
Fair 5  26.3% 
Heterogeneity 4  21.1% 
Discriminatory 
Price/profit 2  10.5% 
Not sure  n/a  1  100.0% 
No response  4  22.2% 
Fair 12  66.7% 
Discriminatory 
Uniform 
Price/profit 2  11.1% 
No response  n/a  11  100.0% 
Both n/a  1  100.0% 
   4  17.4% 
Cost Effective  5  21.7% 
Fair 5  21.7% 
Heterogeneity 6  26.1% 
Not Fair  2  8.7% 
Discriminatory 
Price/profit 1  4.3% 
Neither n/a  2  100.0% 
n/a 12  50.0% 
Cost Effective  2  8.3% 
Fair 7  29.2% 
Heterogeneity 1  4.2% 
Not Fair  1  4.2% 
Uniform 
Uniform 
Price/profit 1  4.2% 
 
  Based on the opinions in the survey, there is no clear evidence strongly supporting 
either payment type; it was essentially split.   
 
Q.16 – Do you have a better understanding of the reverse auction mechanism after 
participating in this workshop? 
 
  Overall the participants felt they had learned something from attending the 
workshop. Based on the discussions during the workshop, many felt the simulations were 
effective as an introduction to the idea of the conservation auction but would like to have 
more exposure to the idea to get a better grasp of the concepts.  
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Q.17 – Do you feel that a reverse auction is a fair mechanism to deliver 
environmental programs for Manitobans? Why? 
 
 
Figure 10 Breakdown of responses of all participants by occupation for Q.17 asking “Do you feel that 
a reverse auction is a fair mechanism to deliver environmental programs for Manitobans?” 
 
  Figure 10 illustrates the opinions of the participants on the fairness of the auction 
mechanism. It is divided by occupation because it was expected that groups were likely 
to have different answers. Most groups (e.g. government, NGOs, students, and 
professors) thought that the conservation mechanism is fair with over 60% of each group 
voting “Yes” for this question. Cost effectiveness was one of the main reasons of being in 
favour of the mechanism. Farm level benefits (e.g. being able to name the price you 
would like for providing EG&S) and flexibility for farmers (i.e. do not have to 
participate, chance to be paid for services) were also important factors for participants 
being in favour of conservation auctions. Another reason individuals thought the 
mechanism was fair was because of the public benefits the auction could provide. Many 
participants indicated that, yes, the mechanism is fair, however, it would depend how it 
was delivered and that there would be challenges in delivering an auction. Some 
suggested that the auction should be delivered with more information/extension for 
producers to ensure understanding, and that it is one tool to be considered, but not the   32
only tool. Those who were unsure of the mechanism stated that they would require more 
information prior to making a decision. 
Conversely the majority of producers (44%) stated that this was not a fair 
mechanism to deliver environmental programming. This is most likely because producers 
are the ones who will be asked to participate in the auction, as opposed to other groups, 
and therefore have more variables to consider than the other groups. The reason why 
producers were opposed to the conservation auction was because of the competitive 
nature behind the auction and the view that it is not fair for producers. They are 
concerned with the potential social implications of putting neighbours in a competitive 
situation with each other, and that only a limited number of farmers would receive a 
payment. There was also concern that the competition will drive down the price of 
providing EG&S and force producers to bid below their costs in order to “win” at the 
auction. Producers were also hesitant about the auction mechanism because it is 
complicated and could reduce participation rates due to a lack of understanding. 
However, some did still say that it was a fair mechanism (28%). Like the other groups, 
producers felt that the auction is a good tool to deliver EG&S, but that it should be used 
in combination with other methods.  Producers also felt that more extension work would 
be required in order to provide information to producers.  
   The final questions were about demographics, which were introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter. Demographic questions were important, especially about 
occupation since the type of occupation (e.g. government, academia, NGO, producer, 
industry) would influence how the survey would be answered.  
 
5  Overall Impressions of the Workshop 
 
  Based on the survey responses and general discussion during each session, the 
conservation auction simulations were successful in raising awareness of conservation 
auctions and the process behind the auction, as well as getting an indication of the 
applicability of conservation auctions in Manitoba. The overall response from 
participants was positive; they were able to participate in an auction simulation to learn, 
in a hands-on way, how the auction mechanism works, and each session was very open to 
questions, comments, and suggestions. The workshops were also a stage for stakeholders 
to interact with each other, share ideas beyond the narrow scope of conservation auctions 
and discuss other relevant issues pertaining to environmental programming in agriculture. 
  There were several suggestions from all groups about how to make the auction 
simulations more effective as an educational tool: namely have them be more realistic 
and representative of real farmers. While the simulation was not designed specifically to 
be used for education about conservation auctions, it was beneficial to learn what 
variables are important to farm level decision making. This type of information can be 
applied to future research in the economic laboratory or in a field trial with real 
producers.  
  Some participants, mostly producers, remained skeptical of the auction 
mechanism, which was somewhat expected. There was much concern about the social 
implications of “pitting farmers against farmers, neighbours against neighbours” and 
lowering the price of EG&S to the point where farmers would be forced to pay out of   33
pocket to provide EG&S. An attempt was made by the workshop administrators to 
explain that lowering the price below costs was not the intention of the auction. Several 
producers who attended the workshops were advocates of ALUS and agreed with the 
method. Comparisons were also made between the European system of environmental 
programming and Canada. While the European system may not be entirely applicable to 
Canada, the information is still useful for the development of a Canadian, or Manitoban 
model.  
  Provided that the auction simulation was based on wetland restoration, a lot of 
discussion surrounded the debate between incenting wetland restoration versus wetland 
conservation.  
 
5.2  Summary of Discussions 
 
  During the workshops, notes were kept to document the conversations and ideas 
that were expressed in each session. While the themes ranged from producer needs to 
actual implementation of auctions, similar points were addressed regardless of the group 
participating that day. This section will provide a summary of those ideas along with 
some explanation.  
 
5.2.1 Implementation  of  Auctions 
 
  If the auctions were to be used in Manitoba, it would be ideal to package the 
program to include multiple BMPs in conjunction with a comprehensive EBI to account 
for a number of environmental benefits while maintaining policy objectives. Multiple 
BMPs give producers more flexibility to incorporate practices that fit their operations. 
For example, wetland restoration (which was used in the simulation) would be more 
appropriate for cattle producers rather than grain producers, because there would be 
higher costs for annual crop producers due to their higher opportunity and nuisance costs 
associated with lost profit and maneuvering around the restored wetlands.  For crop 
producers, another BMP such as zero-till may be a more appropriate practice.  The 
comprehensive EBI would then be applied to quantify the benefits provided from each 
practice for a relative score.  
  In addition to providing a number of BMPs to choose from, numerous participants 
remarked that more conservation practices should be included, such as wetland retention, 
woodlot maintenance or prairie grassland maintenance. In other words, rewarding “good 
behaviour”, or inaction, rather than rewarding those who change from their poor 
practices. A reason why restoration or other changes in practice are being targeted is to 
increase the overall amount of EG&S being provided; however measures should be taken 
to ensure that remaining natural capital is not being lost. Some producers and NGOs 
suggested an ALUS-like approach where producers were rewarded for their conservation 
activities through fixed annual payments.  
  Different levels of targeting should also be considered for an auction program 
such as the issue at hand (e.g. eutrophication in Lake Winnipeg or increasing duck 
populations), EBI, and region. By targeting the EBI, more environmental benefits can be   34
achieved that better reflect the issues at hand. This can be done through the use of 
weighting - where projects that would abate more phosphorus, for example, would get a 
higher score than those that do not, even if those projects can provide other benefits. This 
way other environmental benefits will be acknowledged/credited and the issue can still be 
addressed productively. Targeting the region is especially important in order to have an 
“apples to apples” comparison of producers. This would take into consideration that 
producers are heterogeneous across regions and have different underlying conditions such 
as climate, soil conditions, water availability, population density, proximity to urban 
centers, etc. This will even the playing field so that producers just outside of Winnipeg 
with high land values (higher opportunity costs) would not have to compete with 
producers near Thompson where land values are lower (lower opportunity costs). A 
smaller regional scale would also be a more manageable size to deal with 
administratively.  
  There was concern about the transparency of actions between the government (or 
other program authority) and producers/landowners, in other words providing complete 
information to both parties. To some extent this can be achieved by providing producers 
with an idea of what environmental benefits could be provided if they were to adopt a 
new practice. However, caution should be taken under full disclosure of information as it 
could lead to large degrees of profit seeking by participants, as has been documented by a 
number of authors in the conservation auction literature (refer to Section 1.4.4). 
  Accountability from both parties, government and producers is necessary to make 
sure projects are being implemented and maintained, and that EG&S are being provided 
through the project. There should be a method of ground-truthing bids prior to signing a 
contract, to ensure that the proposed project is relevant and provides adequate EG&S. 
Monitoring and/or enforcement may also be necessary to guarantee that projects that 
were accepted in the auction are implemented properly and the desired EG&S are being 
produced. Self-regulation may also be a potential solution as was introduced in Section 
1.5. 
  Extension would be required prior to the auction to educate producers on the 
intention of the program and the auction process, and how it achieves environmental 
goals in a fair and cost effective manner. Assistance should also be provided to aid in cost 
estimation for producers, as well as bid determination, to make sure that producers have 
solid estimates and can be confident that they will not be “in the red” if they are selected 
in the auction process. This could be a very involved and time consuming process. In 
Saskatchewan, administrators found that it took multiple “kitchen table visits” to work 
with producers to a point where they felt comfortable formulating a bid. This can 
potentially add to the overall costs of delivering the program. However, extension is a 
better option than allowing producers to be influenced by their neighbours and 
wrongfully estimate their costs, or collude.  
Research efforts should go towards contract development and delivery for EG&S 
payments within the auction context. Factors that should be considered are contract 
length as well as the longevity of the practice that was contracted. By this it is meant, 
what happens when the contract expires? Would there be any stipulations requiring 
farmers to keep their land the same even when the contract is complete? Or would it be 
expected that the project would be terminated along with the contract. While it would be   35
greatly beneficial in terms of EG&S to keep the project in place even after the contract, it 
would not be fair to do so.  
5.2.2 Producer  Concerns 
 
  Producers themselves provided some information on the issues that would 
influence decision making, especially in relation to environmental programming and 
conservation auctions. 
•  Neighbours 
o  What types of environmental practices they will be adopting if they are 
participating in the auction, and what they would be bidding? 
o  Would there be any adverse effects on neighbours land as a result of the 
implementation of a project (e.g. wetland restoration leading to flooding of 
neighbouring land)? 
•  Markets 
o  Relevant markets include land, commodities, and inputs 
o  Producers do not want to be locked into a long-term contract, because of 
opportunity costs associated with good market years (e.g. commodity 
markets, land markets) 
o  Producers would like to have additional compensation from the EG&S 
payment for good market years (i.e. be paid not to produce) 
•  Type of production 
o  The type of production can have significant effects on the costs 
(specifically opportunity costs) of implementing EG&S projects, 
especially conservation projects. Grain producers are likely to have higher 
opportunity costs with projects like wetland restoration; this will result in 
very high bids and little chance of being accepted in the auction unless 
they also have very high EG&S delivery potential. Conversely, cattle 
producers will have lower costs and may also extract private benefits from 
a wetland restoration project 
•  Costs 
o  Costs are a significant factor that would affect producer decision making, 
however estimation of costs could be very difficult. One participant 
expressed that the only way to find out the costs of a project is after 
everything has been paid; this participant ultimately had to spend money 
out of pocket to complete an EG&S project in the past because he was 
unable to estimate his costs accurately 
o  Therefore effort should be taken to educate producers on such matters 
•  Contract length 
o  Longer contract lengths are less preferred because of uncertainty of 
opportunity costs the farther you look into the future, therefore shorter 
contracts are preferred (e.g. 4 years for one crop rotation) 
•  Life situation 
o  Older farmers nearing retirement are less likely to enter into the auction so 
that they have flexibility with their land   36
o  Desperate farmers are more likely to participate in the auction to get cash 
quickly, even if it means bidding below costs 
 
•  Profit 
o  Producers would require/want to make a profit off of the auction, however 
the amount of profit depends on how well producers can estimate their 
costs 
•  Previous activity 
o  If a producer has spent time and money towards a certain project (e.g. 
wetland drainage) they are not likely to participate in the auction to 
reverse it 
Many producers indicated that they would be more satisfied with a fixed price 
program to EG&S, but the price has to be right. Current fixed price programs offered by 
Ducks Unlimited Canada and Manitoba Habitat Heritage Corporation have prices that 
can be insufficient to induce participation. For the sake of comparison, the auction 
mechanism ensures that those participating will receive an adequate price for their 
EG&S, so there is a lower chance of having to pay out of pocket. Some participants, who 
had some experience with the European fixed price model, exclaimed that it is tried, 
tested and true, and Canada should use it as a model to develop new programs. While the 
European model may be successful in increasing participation, it is questionable if it is 
actually cost effective. Also, there are many cultural differences between agriculture in 
Canada and Europe, which makes the applicability of the European model questionable.  
While auctions have been used extensively in Australia, the cultural differences in 
Canada may pose as barriers to the acceptance and success of a conservation auction. In 
the workshops, there was a sense of stigma around government payments for EG&S. 
Producers wish to use the payments for income support when that is not their purpose, 
but believe that the government wants to buy EG&S as inexpensively as possible to take 
advantage of farmers and force them to pay out of pocket.  
With respect to the auction, producers were also concerned with the types of 
individuals who would sign-up to participate. The auction might encourage the “worst 
offenders” to put in bids, and subsequently be rewarded by being paid to reverse their 
poor management strategies. Perverse incentives
17 may also arise as good producers see 
that only poor producers are being issued payments. They may reverse some of their 
good management decisions in order to get a payment. One participant was also 
concerned that environmental NGOs would be eligible to partake in the auction. This 
participant expressed that they should not because they can offer land far below the value 
and almost be guaranteed a payment, thus taking payments away from producers.  
  In addition, producers were concerned that, over the course of the auction, they 
would end up bidding themselves down below cost in competition for payments. Some 
participants would vocalize that it makes no sense for producers to purposefully bid 
below their costs for a payment. Of course there are implications if cost estimates were 
not accurate, but even with a rough estimate it is not a rational decision to bid below costs 
unless one is getting some private benefit from the practice in question. Given that this 
                                                 
17 A perverse incentive is an incentive that has an unintended, undesirable effect, usually against the interest 
of the incentive maker   37
was such a popular belief by both producers and other groups (e.g. government, NGOs), 
more education may be required to address this issue.  
 
6 Conclusion 
  Theoretically, the competitive bidding process under a procurement auction can 
lead to economically efficient and cost effective outcomes in the face of information 
asymmetry and lack of a direct market. They become a vehicle to distribute public money 
in a cost effective manner while maximizing the environmental benefit. Recently, the 
procurement auction framework has been applied to use for EG&S in countries such as 
the U.S., Australia, and in Europe. The auction process fits well with the provision of 
EG&S because it is fairly difficult and complicated to value EG&S, therefore there is no 
direct market, and there is a great deal of information asymmetry between producers and 
government.   
  Taking time to carefully think through auction design will be necessary in order to 
have an auction that caters to the public and producers, and that will be cost effective. 
While it may be too soon to be discussing details surrounding the implementation or 
design of an auction in Manitoba, more thought may be required on related issues, such 
as development of an EBI and associated extension program.  
These workshops were developed to allow stakeholders to become aware of the 
conservation auction, and learn more about the process and why they are implemented 
around the world. It was also a platform of discussion amongst stakeholders to gauge 
how acceptable an auction would be in Manitoba to procure EG&S from producers: a lot 
of information and ideas were shared from all sides of the story. Overall, it was a very 
positive experience for all of those involved and generally a positive reaction to the 
auction process was encountered. However, some still remain apprehensive and skeptical 




  Stakeholders in Manitoba have indicated an interest in the use of conservations 
auctions to tackle environmental issues in the province of Manitoba; such as addressing 
eutrophication in Lake Winnipeg. It is recommended that further efforts be made to 
provide outreach and extension to producers to educate them on the auction process. This 
is necessary in order to increase interest in these potential programs, and subsequently 
encourage participation in a future auction. This may be done through more workshops 
similar to the ones reported here, or other extension activities.  
   The authority overlooking the auction must also clearly define the issue that is 
being addressed in order to ensure that the auction is being used effectively. An EBI 
framework, or other system of scoring EG&S, should be developed in concert with the 
issue at hand so that appropriate weighting can be given to priority EG&S to achieve the 
policy goal. Keeping these elements in mind, particular practices eligible for enrollment 
in the auction could be selected. While bidders may have freedom to choose suitable 
practices to implement, having a list of acceptable practices could potentially decrease 
administrative costs for participating producers. The practices should be selected in a way   38
that ensures that there will be heterogeneity among producers with respect to costs in 
order to establish a certain level of competition. Contract design will be a key factor that 
will influence participation by producers. Contracts should be flexible enough to appeal 
to producers, while at the same time rigorous enough to obtain the benefits of the EG&S 
acquired from the auction. Establishing a geographical region to target the auction to 
achieve significant levels of relevant EG&S will also be important to the success of the 
auction. 
  Developing a small scale pilot auction is also recommended in order to test 
potential auction rules and contracts. While lessons may be learned from auctions 
documented in the literature, communities are inherently different and auction design in 
one area may not be completely suitable for another. The pilot will also provide an 
opportunity to evaluate if the auction is suitable for Manitobans: e.g. is there adequate 
producer participation to hold a successful auction. Given that a conservation auction has 
been conducted by the ASWA in Saskatchewan, it would be useful to complete an 
auction with different rules (e.g. uniform pricing instead of discriminatory pricing) in 
Manitoba as a comparison.  
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Assumptions from conventional auction theory 
 
•  Auction sells a single item  
•  Bidders are risk neutral 
•  Bidders have independent private values: Each bidder has a valuation of the traded good that 
is unknown to the seller and rival bidders and that is not influenced by others’ views (no 
resale value) 
•  Symmetry among bidders where the probability distribution of valuations is the same for all 
bidders 
•  Seller does not know each bidder’s exact valuation and perceives this valuation to be drawn 
randomly from some probability distribution. Likewise, bidders have prior knowledge about 
the probability distribution of rival bidders’ valuation, but not about the competitors’ exact 
valuations  
•  Competitive bidding: all bidders enter the auction with the intent to win and know the 
number of rival bidders. There is no collusion and bidders do not have the ability to influence 
market demand.  
•  Payment is a function of bids alone 
•  There are zero costs to bid construction and implementation 
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We would like to know your opinion about the workshop you have participated in today.  
 
Please rate the following statements from 1 to 5 by circling the appropriate number: 
1 – Strongly disagree  4 – Somewhat agree 
2 – Somewhat disagree  5 – Strongly agree 
3 – Neither agree nor disagree   
 
 
1.  I enjoyed participating in this workshop 
1  2  3 4 5 
 
 
2.  I learned something in this workshop 
1  2  3 4 5 
 
 
3.  I found the visual presentation on the computer screen useful 
1  2  3 4 5 
 
 






















We would now like to ask you some questions in regards to environmental programs in 
Manitoba.  
 
7.  Do you currently participate in an environmental program? 
Circle   Yes     No 
If yes, what program are you a part of and why did you choose to participate? 
 
 
8a. Would you participate in an auction for any practice if it was offered?  





8b. If you answered yes above, would you participate in an auction for any of the following BMP 
(beneficial management practice)? Please circle.  
a.  Forage  conversion   Yes   No 
b.  Zero  tillage    Yes   No 
c.  Holding pond installation  Yes    No 
d.  Wetland  restoration   Yes   No 
e.  Wetland  conservation   Yes   No 
f .   O t h e r s              
 
9.  In general, would you know your costs (farm parameters) associated with any of the 
abovementioned practices? 
Circle   Yes    No 
 
10. Do you think that an auction would be an effective tool to deliver incentive programs in Manitoba 
to support agricultural producers in reducing identified environmental risks and improving the 
management of agricultural land? 






11. Do you think that an auction would be an effective tool for providing incentives to induce more 
restoration of wetlands? 




12. Would you participate to an actual auction aimed at wetland restoration if it was offered?  






13a.  What contract length would you agree to if you were going to restore wetlands? 
 
Annual   Yes   No 
5 years  Yes    No 
10 years  Yes    No 
20 years  Yes    No 
Permanent Yes   No 
Other   Yes   No 
  Please indicate length:                       . 
 
13b.  What is the maximum contract length that you would consider? 
 
 
We would like to get your feelings and opinions on the reverse auction mechanism.  
 
There are two different ways to give out payments; discriminatory where you are paid what you bid, 
and uniform where everyone receives the same unit price (which is equal to the unit price of the first 
rejected bid therefore is larger than your own unit price). 
 
14.  Please circle the payment type that was used in the session you participated in today. 
     












16.  Do you have a better understanding of the reverse auction mechanism after participating in 
this workshop? 
Circle   Yes    No 
 
 
17.  Do you feel that a reverse auction is a fair mechanism to deliver environmental programs for 
Manitobans?   











Under 25    Between 41 and 60
Between 26 and 40    Over 61
 
Occupation 
Farmer – crops    Government  
Farmer - livestock    Non-government organization  
Farmer – mixed operation    Industry  
Professor   Student  














THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
 
Male     Female